Introduction The World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) held in Johannesburg is an international gathering which last took place in Rio in 1992. Put very simply, this summit is the forum in which we the human race, or at least its democratic and undemocratic representatives, discuss the manner in which we exploit our environment, the impact that our exploitation has on our habitat (seas, earth and biosphere) and the manner in which the natural resources of our planet are distributed amongst its inhabitants.

Many diverse and fundamental issues can be raised under such a grand title, and in a world with 6 billion people and growing of which 50% are living below the poverty line (i.e. are unable to provide their minimal nutritional needs), and 70% are very, very poor, resources are badly depleted and the earth, the seas and the biosphere are badly polluted, many of the issues for discussion are highly controversial and likely to be addressed in a highly emotional manner. Add to this political conflicts and cultural, ideological and religious differences, and one can expect a fairly heated and eventful summit.

So when we were asked by the editor of the Fishing Industry Handbook to write an article which deals with the implications of WSSD for fisheries, we felt somewhat overwhelmed by the enormity of the task. The reason is that almost more than any other issue, fisheries contain all of the above ingredients in particularly large doses. Fishing is not just an occupation but also a way of life, a statement of culture, and even an ideological position. It is virtually the only significant hunting occupation which has survived the onslaught of the “politically correct” way of life of “civilized societies”. Fish resources are considered by many to be subsistence resources which provide cheap protein for poor coastal communities.

Others see them as lucrative commodities with high earnings potential and food for the rich. Different countries apply different ethical conventions to the exploitation of natural resources. Some see them simply as a resource to be exploited while others are concerned about impacts on the environment and on aquatic species biodiversity.

Fish live in a fluid environment where many laws of the land do not apply. Fish do not recognize territorial barriers or political convention. They can move from EEZ to EEZ or from EEZ to high seas making a mockery of management programs and political agreements. Fish resources are considered by many to be common property resources, meaning they belong to everybody or alternatively they belong to nobody. This somewhat fuzzy definition is a Pandora’s box which leads to conflict at both the national and international level. It is this last issue which warrants some discussion since history has demonstrated that resources which are regarded as common property tend to be overexploited and are often destroyed by a process referred to as “the Tragedy of the Commons”.

This term is used to describe a situation in which the logic of open access to common property resources causes individuals to act in a manner which is damaging to the common good. This leads to fierce competition in which increasing attempts are made to exploit larger and larger amounts of the resource. This always leads to the economic demise of the exploiters and to the biological destruction of the resource.

Our article therefore deals with probably the most contentious issue to be discussed at WSSD, the issue of exploitation rights which in fisheries are referred to as access rights. Who should be permitted to fish? Why should some be privileged over others in regard to common property resources? And closely related to this, should fishing simply be a money making industry which strives for maximum long term economic benefit, or should fishing be given a social role at the expense of its earning potential.

The South African angle to this debate is clear. The South African fishery was and largely still is dominated by a relatively small number group of fishing access rights holders. The transformation of the South African fishing industry in recent years to a more equitable and representative industry has been achieved mainly (but not only) by opening white controlled fishing industries to other ethnic groups. Although this has given many black empowerment groups a considerable stake in the fishing industry, it has not fundamentally changed the basic structure of the industry which involves limited entry to a select number of rights holders, coupled with a very centralized management approach.

This has created much unhappiness amongst many people, mainly from coastal communities, who feel that a much more open system should be applied to the management of South African fish resources. Indeed, a 260 strong delegation of disgruntled South African fishers has made its way to WSSD to present demands for greater distribution of fishing rights amongst a wider group of potential participants. Some even advocate a complete open access approach in which virtually everybody should be allowed to fish when, where and as much as he or she wishes.

This article is based on a study conducted by OLRAC a few years ago when the question of access rights to South African fish resources was being debated. The key issue motivating this article is the question of how one goes about obtaining maximum benefit for most people out of living marine resources. This question touches on a wide range of academic disciplines. It is also a question that can be and currently is being asked of other forms of economic endeavour in the South African economy. From the work presented here, it appears that their are two broad approaches. These are, roughly speaking, either

1. To embark on the industrial ‘free market’ orientated approach to fisheries management or
2. To apply a more social approach to the process of allocation of fishing rights where subsistence and artisanal sectors are the main recipients of such rights.

Both (1) and (2) encompass a variety of approaches, and there is a considerable grey area between the two where for example the inshore component of the resource is allocated to coastal communities while offshore resources are allocated to large industrial bodies. A few key approaches and attitudes can however be identified. An important example of the second type (2) is that of a community based fishery, based on artisanal fishing technologies. There is a prevalent view that this form of fishing is better for South Africa than the larger industrial type of fishing operation. The thinking behind this is probably related to an extent to the ‘small is beautiful’ arguments and to the notion of the ’goodness’ of the ‘noble fisherman’.

This general view lends support for a system of allocation of access rights which is biased in favour of small scale fishing based on fishermen living on the coast near to the resource using unsophisticated technology. Another feature of this approach which is appealing to its proponents is that it leads to the direct allocation of fishing access rights to the intended beneficiaries of South Africa’s living marine wealth.

Benefits are therefore designed to accrue directly to the users, rather than indirectly by way of employment, shareholding or a general increase in the GDP of the nation and the nation’s balance of trade. The participants of the hypothetical artisanal fishery are therefore not so much engaged in an economic enterprise as they are earning a living for themselves. We note that no clear concept of workplace hierarchy exists in the hypothetical artisanal fishery and the fisherman is the quota holder, the wage earner and the skipper.

The arguments for and against these two approaches could occupy the pages of theoretical academic journals for decades. The study reported on here is based, instead, on an empirical examination of actual practical experience with the management of demersal fish resources, or with general management practices of all the fish resources of a particular nation. Our conclusions from this exercise are as follows.

We noted that issues concerned with the management and allocation of fish resources cannot be addressed in isolation from global economic and social developments. Key amongst these are (a) the population explosion (the world’s population has doubled since the 1950’s, and has increased sixfold since 1800), (b) the associated increased demand for fish products, particularly in the high value high quality area but also as a basic source of protein, and (c) easy access to international markets - basically the development of a global market.

Although increasing demand for food production is feasible through farming and aquaculture, any production increases that might be feasible for fish resources are very modest by comparison, since the productivity of fish stocks is limited by natural forces. The most important challenge for fisheries management is either to try to preserve current catch levels, or, to attempt to enhance long term yield by employing policies which eventually drive stocks to a level that generates a high level of sustainable yield. These management options involve difficult trade-offs that can only be implemented if mechanisms for strict control and enforcement of fishing regulations are in place.

a) The industrial approach The archetype of this approach is the developed modern demersal trawl fishery which is characterised by:

1. Use of technology designed to enhance efficiency and to capitalise on economies of scale
2. Clear workplace hierarchies and delegation of responsibilities
3. Fishing as an economic enterprise
4. Substantial post-harvest processing of fish for access to high value international markets
5. Vertical integration of harvesting, processing and marketing sectors.

Proponents of this approach to the management and development of marine fisheries claim that the indirect benefits to employees and to the citizens of the country via taxes and the balance of trade exceed those realised in artisanal type fisheries. In these (industrial, demersal) fisheries differences in control and management centre around the following considerations:

1. The mode of access: Whether limited access or open access and if the former, then how this access is granted, i.e. as an individual quota, or on the basis of an effort allowance as in the South African squid jigging industry. What conditions apply, e.g. the nature of any fishing levies.
2. Security of access: Whether access rights are allocated in perpetuity, and if so whether any conditions are attached. Whether these rights are allocated for a limited period of time, what this period is, and what conditions apply for renewal of access.
3. Divisibility and Transferability: Whether access rights are freely divisible and transferable and if not, what conditions apply for transfer and/or division of rights.
4. Other management regulations: An important consideration here is whether these are relatively simple or whether complex, bureaucratic and cumbersome.

Typical to any type of fishery one also needs to consider the problems of rent dissipation, ease of control, benefits to users, benefits to the nation, options for stock rehabilitation, ease and reliability of scientific data collection and other characteristics. It is well documented that industrial fisheries have failed both biologically and economically, and others have failed economically but not biologically. Other fisheries have not experienced dramatic collapse transitions but nevertheless have gradually become trapped in high cost unproductive situations. The reasons for this are many but the main contributors to such developments (high cost unproductive situations) were identified as:

1. Open access: In certain cases, open access modes of allocation of fishing rights (e.g. USA east coast groundfish fisheries).
2. Scientific factors: Scientific ignorance combined with politically/economically motivated TAC allocations (e.g. Newfoundland cod).
3. Environmental factors: Environmental variability might lead to the “collapse” of certain resources either because they were reduced to a less resilient level or simply because the environmental impact was beyond the species tolerance level (low oxygen events along the South African west coast have led to the death of thousands of tons of lobsters in a matter of days).
4. Modern harvesting techniques: The advent of modern harvesting techniques and the financial resources to deploy these on a very large scale.
5. Excess capacity: A general over-abundance of harvesting capacity on a global scale, intense political and economic pressure to utilise these capital resources, and the international mobility of these fishing fleets. For example, the fact that many European nations developed itinerant international fishing fleets backed up by extensive shipbuilding and fishing gear construction industries during the growth of industrial fishing after the second World War. After the International Law of the Sea Convention, the exclusion of foreign fleets from coastal waters all over the world left these industries in an overcapitalised state with heavy financial debts. This led to political/economic pressure from these industries on their governments to explore, in any possible way, and at any price, options for access to fish stocks anywhere in the world.

The main points which emerged from our examination of the industrial cases were that it is clear that large industrial fisheries have the capability to remove large quantities of fish from the sea and have in the past been guilty of overexploiting resources, leading to rent dissipation. This has largely been the result of over-investment in fishing effort before the limited nature of fish stocks was fully appreciated.

Controlling the rate of fishing through the regulation of effort and by controlling catch capabilities can be difficult, as fishermen invariably find ways to improve performance by making better use of catch methods at their disposal or by increasing aspects of fishing effort that are not controlled. Catch quotas can be effective at conserving stock biomass in industrial fisheries, but if set on a global basis for a fishery, do not prevent increases in fishing effort.

This increased effort, as evidenced in the Icelandic fishery prior to the introduction of ITQ’s and in the Atlantic halibut fishery in 1987 where 70% of the global TAC was taken in just 3 days, often results in shorter and shorter fishing seasons, with overcapitalisation and seasonal interruption to onshore processing facilities (implying significant rent dissipation). Catch quotas therefore need to be allocated individually and should be freely transferable to ensure economic efficiency.

ITQ systems have largely been successful in increasing economic efficiency and economic benefits in both New Zealand and Iceland, and in providing for the long term sustainability of the resource. Noting the problem of initial allocation, ITQ’s are popular with fishermen, but become more difficult to enforce as more operators become involved in the fishery. Targeted industrial fisheries with little or no artisanal activity such as the South African and Argentinean hake fishery, produce high quality product and can make large contributions to national economic welfare. Value-added products are traded internationally into diverse markets providing foreign exchange contributions and net economic benefits to the nation.

While monitoring and data collection in industrial fisheries is not hampered by a preponderance of users as with artisanal type fisheries, a potential complication is the phenomenon of hyper-stability in which creeping efficiency increases can result in catch rate providing a misleading impression of resource trends. Good examples are the dramatic increase in catch rates following the introduction of new types of hooks in the Atlantic halibut fishery in the 1970’s, and the trawling innovations in the Newfoundland cod fishery

(a good local example is the failure of crew member allocations to limit effort in the squid jigging fishery in South Africa). It is essential that the scientific management of demersal resources includes an annual or even biannual survey for obtaining independent estimates of trends in resource biomass. b) The “social” approach

To demonstrate the possible outcome of the so-called social approach to the allocation of fishing rights we give below examples from three nations where the more “social approach” was adopted.

The Philippines: The Philippines fishery is often used as an example of a community based fishery that sustains large numbers of people. The following is a quote from a study conducted by the Manila Department of Labour and Employment and the International Labour Organisation’s Asian Employment Program, 1993.

“The coastal environment of the country has suffered severely from overexploitation, destruction and abuse. The resource in its present condition is not suited to offer adequate livelihood for the current number of users, especially in the small-scale capture fisheries sector. In order to revert the past and the present degradation, the number of small-scale fishers has to be drastically reduced to a level that grants resource exploitation at optimum levels”. In reality therefore the management of fisheries in the Philippines has resulted in a major crisis, and policy makers are calling for radical steps in an attempt to halt the irreversible annihilation of stocks. In the Philippines it is estimated that with 1.3 million people currently engaged in small-scale fisheries, 50% of them must find employment in other sectors if resources are to exploited at an optimal level.

Japan: In Japan, the mode of access is linked to a feudal system of a bygone age, and its modern counterpart is heavily bureaucratic. The economic benefit from Japan’s inshore fisheries is at a subsistence level, their fisheries are hugely subsidised and the main function that management achieves seems to be to maintain a level of political peace. Biologically the resources are in a shocking state, with 24 species being classed as on the brink of extinction. Fishing communities exist in a state of poverty and there is little or no economic rent. Morocco: Since artisanal fisheries generally only provide fishermen with survival based on a subsistence level, they are not in a position to be able to reduce catches when this is needed to relieve pressure on resources, because of the impact it would have on their economic survival.

The result is intense social and political pressure to permit the continued access to resources by large numbers of people, and technical measures to reduce fishing effort are also strongly resisted. In the Moroccan hake fishery for example, artisanal fishing operations are not in a position to comply with the same mesh size regulation as Spanish industrial trawlers because of the effect it would have on their incomes. The hake resource in Morocco is severely overexploited.

The main points which emerged from our examination of the “social/artisanal” case were that artisanal fishing promotes the fragmentation of access rights to the fishery leading to the dissipation of economic rent via a loss of the advantage of economies of scale, and via open access type escalation of fishing effort. Further rent dissipation occurs because of the lack of access to high value international markets. Control of the fishery is compromised by the large number of users and the dependence of fishing communities on the resource for their daily survival. Although large scale abuse of fish resources can be caused by either a centralised industrial sector or by a fragmented artisanal one, the former can be harnessed and controlled relatively easily while the latter cannot. In the Philippines it is estimated that with 1.3 million people currently engaged in small-scale fisheries, every second one of them must find employment in other sectors if resources are to be exploited at an optimal level.

As larger numbers of fishermen become involved in the fishery and competition for catches becomes more severe, there are increased pressures in artisanal fisheries to ignore any fishing regulations that may be in force. The large numbers of participants associated with artisanal fisheries means that enforcement and surveillance of fishing activities is extremely difficult, as has been proved in the case of the Philippines fishery. In Japan, where 300,000 people are involved in fishing activities, traditional community structures have been utilised to control access and implement regulations on fishing activity. However for such enforcement to be successful, strong and well established community structures must be in place.

In Japan these structures date back to feudal times and are entrenched even to this day. It is difficult to see how artisanal fishing community structures, that have, virtually, never existed in South Africa, could be created and utilised in a system of resource allocation or property rights. We note that population increases in the Transkei in recent years, have resulted in massive pressure on inter-tidal resources because of the lack of any effective way to control access.

The result of the above are that artisanal fishermen are often locked in a state of poverty and the resource is heavily depleted. Since the artisanal mode of access to marine resources leads to fishing pressure which is linked to population density, the increasing human population is a threat to marine resources where artisanal modes of access exist. Since artisanal fisheries generally only provide fishermen with a subsistence level of income, they are not in a position to be able to reduce catches when this is needed to relieve pressure on resources, because of the impact it would have on their economic survival.

The result is intense social and political pressure to permit the continued access to resources by large numbers of people. Technical measures to reduce fishing effort are also strongly resisted. Data collection for use in stock assessment analysis, so important in ensuring the long-term sustainable management of a fishery, becomes difficult in artisanal fisheries because of the large numbers of fishermen and vessels involved, and data reliability is poor. Artisanal fishing typically targets multispecies fisheries using multiple gear types, as do industrial multispecies fisheries with an artisanal component, and this poses management problems due to the multispecies nature of fish harvesting which makes the management of any one species extremely difficult.

In summary, artisanal fisheries are characterised by (a) increasing pressure for access to resources in response to increasing population levels, (b) stock depletion, (c) economic and political obstacles to limiting access, (d) dissipation of the bulk of the potential economic rent from the fishery, (e) an absence of value added processing, and, (f) participants locked into a cycle of poverty. Hence, even though an artisanal mode of resource access offers clear political benefits and benefits of perceived equity of access, there are problems that need to be weighed up.

c) Short discussion How then should equity be maintained when allocating access rights, and do economic or social criteria best serve the nation? It is important to consider that determination of what is fair is very subjective. Management regulations controlling access invariably favour preventing pre-emption of one group of participants by another. On a social level this may at first appear unsatisfactory. However, there are strong arguments to support the view that it is most fair and equitable to the nation as a whole to have an allocation that maximises the benefits that the nation can receive from its resources.

While it may be politically attractive to support a social approach to the allocation of access rights, it should be remembered that on a macro-economic level, South Africa will be best served by allocating rights to those who will use them most efficiently, and who will thus generate the most economic benefit from the fishery. These benefits can then be used to promote both the economic and social development of the country, thereby removing the perceived dichotomy between social and economic objectives. The case studies have shown that the industrial sector is most likely to provide maximum economic benefits from the fishery and should thus be favoured in the allocation of access rights.

Trying to decide what is equitable has resulted in numerous conflicts over access rights in many parts of the world, as highlighted in the case studies presented here. Political and social arguments about access to fish resources have often had negative consequences for both the long term sustainability of fish stocks (as in the Pacific cod fishery where social and political pressures ensured that TAC’s remained far higher than the MSY, resulting in the collapse of the cod stock), and the contribution of the fisheries sector to the economic development of the country. Policies on access that attempt to satisfy everyone, often end up being confused and satisfying nobody. Fisheries management involves making hard decisions and must be based on rational and informed analysis, not on emotive argument.

Fisheries regulations are generally easier to enforce in industrial fisheries than in artisanal fisheries, and have dramatic effects since management is dealing with only small numbers of vessels that are catching large quantities of fish. Large companies are also in a position to be able to absorb temporary cuts or reductions in catch rates as part of a long term strategy to rebuild stocks without facing untenable economic conditions, and a sensible long-term view has been taken by the industry in both South Africa and Namibia over recent years. In addition, large industrial fishing companies are able to diversify their activities into other fishing activities or into non-fishing ventures, particularly when the industry is vertically integrated.

Although both the artisanal and industrial case studies presented here support the theoretical prediction that open access to fish resources invariably leads to resource depletion, a fundamental difference between artisanal and industrial fisheries appears to be the forces driving increased demand for access, and the prospect of addressing the problem. The escalation of artisanal fishing effort is driven largely by increases in population density. In the industrial sector, however, the escalation in fishing effort are mainly linked to, scientific ignorance combined with politically/economically motivated TAC allocations and the advent of modern, “factory scale”, harvesting techniques.

Benefits to users in industrial fisheries accrue through direct employment or as part of the normal benefits enjoyed by shareholders in any economic enterprise. Although not easily quantifiable, the concentration of capital in industrial fisheries leads to sophisticated post-harvest processing of fish to maximise end prices in a diverse and high priced international market. This implies considerably more employment linked to the resource than is the case in artisanal type fisheries where limited processing is available and where the least capital intensive means of disposing of product in the highest priced market is often sought. This limits ones marketing options and makes one very vulnerable to price fluctuations and to competing products.

Since artisanal fisheries generate very little taxation compared to industrial fisheries, the benefits to the nation through foreign exchange earnings and taxation (income tax, normal company tax) from industrial fisheries is comparatively very large. To conclude our short and rather subjective article we feel that, with the risk of making ourselves very unpopular in the present South African political climate, that the concept of the artisanal “noble fisherman” is based on the demographic realities and population sizes of the past century.

South Africa should, therefore adopt a modern, centralised approach into the allocation of fishing rights where coastal communities are equal participants in the exploitation of marine resources via a modern “free market” mechanism. Being fully aware that coastal communities often lack the financial means to facilitate such participation there is merit in the demand that the allocation of fishing rights be used initially to fund such participation, as long as it clear that even this process is part of a limited access process, that in the end recipients of such reallocated rights will obtain long term security of access, and that there will always be some who do not receive access rights.